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يمنات – صنعاء
كشف تقرير صادر عن الجهاز المركزي للرقابة والمحاسبة بعدن عن حجم مخيف من وقائع الفساد والتجاوزات التي تورط فيها مسؤولون رسميون في الحكومة المعترف بها دوليا.
قضايا فساد متعددة
وسلط التقرير الضوء على قضايا متعددة تتعلق بالاستيلاء على المال العام، والتهرب الجمركي، وقضايا التزوير، ونهب أراضي الدولة، وغياب الرقابة في عدد من المؤسسات الحكومية، ومبالغ مالية ضخمة صرفت تخت مسمى “التسهيلات”.
رسوم اربع سنوات
وكشف التقرير عن تجاوزات مالية جسيمة في القنصلية العامة بجدة، تمثلت بمخالفات مالية وإدارية كبيرة في عمل القنصلية.
وتتعلق المخالفات بتحصيل الموارد القنصلية وصرفها خلال الفترة من العام 2018 إلى العام 2022
زيادة غير قانونية
ومن أبرز التجاوزات الزيادة غير القانونية في الرسوم، حيث فرضت القنصلية زيادات غير معتمدة قانونياً على الرسوم القنصلية، ما أسفر عن تحصيل مبالغ إضافية تجاوزت 91 مليون و236 ألف ريال سعودي.
رسوم الجوازات
وكذلك عدم توريد المبالغ المحصلة، حيث بين التقرير أن القنصلية لم تورد كامل المبالغ المحصلة من رسوم إصدار الجوازات والغرامات المختلفة.
وبلغ إجمالي المبالغ غير الموردة 156 مليون و656 ألف ريال سعودي، في خرق صريح للإجراءات المالية الرسمية.
للاشتراك في قناة موقع يمنات على التليغرام انقر هنا
Three American doctors working at a Baptist missionary hospital in Yemen were shot dead on 29 December. A lone gunman, subsequently arrested and named as Abdulrazzak al-Kamel, entered the facility in the southern town of Jibla posing as a relative and opened fire with a Kalashnikov rifle. Yemeni officials quoted by Reuters said that Al-Kamel told them the attack was designed to bring him 'closer to Allah'. He was a student at Yemen's Al-Iman university, which was briefly shut down in 2001 over claims that it was a centre of Islamic militancy. A statement from the US Embassy in Yemen urged any US citizens in the country to increase their vigilance. Washington believes that Al-Qaeda operatives have taken shelter in parts of Yemen where central government authority is limited, and in November the CIA launched a rocket attack northeast of Sanaa, killing six suspected members of the organisation (MEED 8:11:02).
On October 12, 2000, two suicide pilots of a small bomb-laden boat pulled alongside of the USS Cole at midship, offered friendly gestures to several crew members, and detonated their explosives.
The U.S. destroyer, en route to the Persian Gulf, was making a prearranged fuel stop at the port of Aden, Yemen, when the attack occurred.
The blast ripped a 40-foot-wide hole near the waterline of the Cole, killing 17 U.S. sailors and injuring nearly 40 other crew members.
The FBI quickly sent to Yemen more than 100 agents from the Counterterrorism Division, the FBI Laboratory, and various field offices. Director Louis Freeh arrived soon after to assess the situation and to meet with the President of Yemen.
Numerous FBI field offices and legal attaches, several hundred FBI agents and support staff, and Joint Terrorism Task Force personnel ultimately took part in the investigation.
The FBI also established a cooperative working relationship with the government of Yemen. On November 29, 2000, a guidance document was signed between the U.S. State Department and the Yemeni government setting protocols for questioning witnesses and suspects. FBI and Yemeni investigators proceeded with interviews, and a large amount of physical evidence was shipped back to the FBI Laboratory for examination.
FBI photographers took pictures of the crime scene that assisted in identifying the victims and provided detailed photographic information regarding the impact of the explosion. Later, personnel from the FBI Lab, as well as bomb technicians and agents from New York and Jackson Field Offices, traveled to Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Mississippi, where the Cole had been brought, to examine the ship for additional evidence.
The extensive FBI investigation ultimately determined that members of the al Qaeda terrorist network planned and carried out the bombing. The investigation also revealed that the USS Cole bombing followed an unsuccessful attempt on January 3, 2000, to bomb another U.S. Navy ship, the USS The Sullivans. In this earlier incident, the terrorist boat sank before the explosives could be detonated; however, the boat and the explosives were salvaged. The boat was then refitted, and the explosives were tested and reused in the USS Cole attack.
By the end of 2000, Yemeni authorities had arrested several suspects, including Jamal Muhammad Ahmad Al-Badawi and Fahad Muhammad Ahmad Al-Quso, two of the alleged masterminds of the USS The Sullivans and the USS Cole plots. Al-Badawi and Al-Quso—known al Qaeda operatives who trained in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan during the 1990s—were later killed in separate U.S. airstrikes.
Another key figure in the plot—Tawfiq Mohummad bin Saleh bin Roshayed bin Attash—is currently in U.S. custody.
Abdullah Al-Rimi remains wanted for questioning relating to any knowledge he might have of the attack on the USS Cole.
By By Tech. Sgt. Michael Battles, U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa Public Affairs
RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, Germany - “I still don’t know if the bloody footprints on the ground are those of a survivor or one of the 19 who lost their lives that day.”
Those are the words of Master Sgt. Norma Gillette, U.S. Air Forces Europe - Air Forces Africa Innovation and Transformation Office superintendent and survivor of the Khobar Towers bombing terrorist attack 25 years ago.
On the night of June 25, 1996, a bomb was detonated near the Khobar Tower housing complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 Airmen and injuring more than 400 U.S. and international military members and civilians. The towers housed coalition forces supporting Operation Southern Watch, a no-fly zone operation in Southern Iraq.
Gillette, a Michigan Air National Guardsman from the 110th Wing, Battle Creek Air National Guard Base, now on orders to Ramstein Air Base, Germany, was an active-duty senior Airman on her first deployment serving as a dormitory manager at the time of the attack.
Gillette recalled the evening of June 25 began just like any other night on deployment.
“It was hot that night, unbearably hot, so a friend and I sat in one of our common areas instead of walking the perimeter,” she said. “All of a sudden, the glass door shattered, and we were blown across the room. We had burns, cuts and couldn’t hear - [we] didn’t know what had gone on.”
Gillette said anyone able to walk immediately helped care for the wounded, transporting and assisting anywhere possible, from using doors as stretchers to helping someone who lost a limb.
“Whether you were injured or not, if you could walk and help, you were doing it,” she said. “They kept bringing more and more people in, and we had no clue what was going on. We were very confused, it’s dark out and there’s bodies all over the place.”
Gillette received the Purple Heart for injuries she sustained that day and counts it as one of the most formative experiences in her life.
The Purple Heart is also worn by the current USAFE-AFAFRICA commander, Gen. Jeff Harrigian, who was also deployed to Khobar at the time of the bombing.
Then-Capt. Harrigian was deployed from the 58th Fighter Squadron, 33rd Fighter Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and was in the towers when the attack occurred.
“In our squadron, we lost 12 guys,” Harrigian said. “That was a very emotional event and something that will always be a part of who I am. Because of this horrific act of terrorism at Khobar Tower, 19 bright and talented individuals can never be replaced.
“These memories forever remind me that stakes are high and the sacrifice is real when we step up to the plate to serve our country,” he added.
Gillette said one of her most cherished possessions is a photo of the 19 fallen Airmen in their flag-draped caskets in the back of an aircraft before they were returned home.
“Twenty-five years later, [the photo is] in pristine condition, and I can still tell you exactly how many [Airmen], how they’re lined up and who was where,” Gillette said. “It still stays really fresh in your mind. It isn’t a, ‘This happened to me’ thing. It’s them, all 19 of them.”
Gillette said she prefers not to wear her service dress because of complicated emotions surrounding the Purple Heart decoration and what it means to her. At times, she said, she feels unworthy of receiving the same medal as the 19 Airmen who lost their lives. She still gets emotional when discussing the attack and the aftermath.
“It’s been 25 years since that night, and we cannot forget,” Gillette said. We cannot forget those we lost that night. Nineteen men from an [Airman 1st class] to a captain are among those we lost that night. We cannot forget them!”
On this day, the 25th anniversary of the Khobar Towers Bombing, we remember our 19 lost brothers in arms: Capt. Christopher Adams, Capt. Leland Haun, Master Sgt. Michael Heiser, Master Sgt. Kendall Kitson, Tech. Sgt. Daniel Cafourek, Tech. Sgt. Patrick Fennig, Tech. Sgt. Thanh Nguyen, Staff Sgt. Ronald King, Staff Sgt. Kevin Johnson, Sergeant Millard Campbell, Senior Airman Earl Cartrette Jr., Senior Airman Jeremy Taylor, Airman 1st Class Christopher Lester, Airman 1st Class Brent Marthaler, Airman 1st Class Brian McVeigh, Airman 1st Class Peter Morgera, Airman 1st Class Joseph Rimkus, Airman 1st Class Justin Wood, and Airman 1st Class Joshua Woody.
The Purple Heart is awarded to military members who are injured or killed in the service of their country.
The Gulf monarchies have been active partners in the United States-led coalition against so-called Islamic State (or Daesh, al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fil Iraq wa al-Sham) since its launch in September 2014. Nevertheless, regional rivalries and shifting alliances involving states and non-state actors are increasingly influencing the Gulf monarchies’ efforts against the self-proclaimed caliphate. Geopolitical factors impede a full cooperative approach against the mutual threat of transnational jihadism.
Supporting the military campaign
The engagement of the Gulf monarchies – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – along with Jordan (not a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council) involves three complementary axes: military, financial and cultural.
From a military point of view, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been the most active Arab partners within the Global Coalition. Their airstrikes peaked after a young Jordanian pilot from a prominent tribe in the southern city of Karak was imprisoned and burned to death by Daesh in February 2015. With well-honed military skills, Jordan represents the Gulf’s western flank but it is also deeply connected to the Levantine social tissue. Amman’s role has been critical in training the Free Syrian Army.
Beyond support for the coalition against Daesh, Jordan is hosting NATO-led efforts to build the capacity of Iraqi officers in areas such as countering improvised explosive devices, explosive ordnance disposal and demining.
The UAE have built the most capable air force of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). According to the U.S. State Department’s Country Report on Terrorism, the number of Abu Dhabi’s sorties flown against Daesh is second only to Washington. Emiratis have been increasingly able to conduct aerial refueling and to perform strikes against dynamic targets, such as armoured vehicles and troop transports. By comparison, Saudi Arabia predominantly strikes fixed and static targets such as military headquarters, training camps and facilities. As was the case during the Libyan campaign, Qatar doesn’t bomb but supports the Global Coalition by conducting combat air patrol operations over Syria. (See Frederic Wehrey’s article for more on GCC contributions)
Cutting off jihadi financing
Private financial contributions to armed jihad are a sensitive issue for Gulf monarchies vis-à-vis Western partners. Kuwait emerged as the financial hub for individuals or charities willing to support extremist Sunni militias in Syria. This trend, which peaked in 2012, was possible due to a de-regulated legislation on association freedom and money transferring.
From 2014, Gulf monarchies began to revise national legislation, introducing laws to prevent jihadi fundraising, monitor charities’ activities, withdraw the citizenship of nationals suspected of terrorism, and tackle jihadi financing and recruitment on the web. Royal decrees have been promulgated to increase penalties for terrorism-related crimes and strengthen finance regulations on counterterrorism. However, some grey zones persist: for instance, the classic hawala system of money transfer (illegal in Oman) can be used as an informal means to finance insurgent activities.
Bahrain, the regional financial centre, has hosted several international conferences and workshops on this topic over the past couple of years. Moreover, in May 2016, GCC countries and Canada launched a strategic dialogue to stop jihadi financing. Among other measures, Kuwait constituted the Financial Intelligence Unit devoted to the inquiry of illicit activities, while Saudi Arabia introduced new incentives for whistleblowers, offering fiscal reward to anyone who denounces jihadi fundraising and money laundering (Riyadh also co-chairs the Counter-IS Finance Group with United States and Italy).
While necessary, some of these counter-terrorism measures have generated debate among analysts, given that they could also be used as effective tools to repress political dissent, maximising monarchical control of the public sphere.
Countering the jihadi narrative
Alongside the military and financial tools, the containment and eradication of jihadi activities require coordinated counter-ideological efforts. Gulf monarchies have come to realise that Daesh could not be turned into an anti-Iranian proxy: not only have many Gulf citizens joined the so-called caliphate as mujahidin but, since 2015, the number of terrorist attacks on the GCC soil has risen, targeting predominantly Shia communities in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. So the defeat of Daesh has progressively become decisive for Gulf monarchies’ national security too, raising the threat perception in the Arab Gulf and, consequently, enhancing opportunities for cooperation between GCC members and Western countries.
According to official data, at least 2500 Saudis and 2000 Jordanians joined Daesh, as well as 70 Kuwaitis, 10 Qataris and 15 Emiratis (unofficial estimations). The Arab Gulf’s imams and muftis have multiplied public condemnations of Daesh, rejecting the ideological core of the so-called caliphate’s political project, which challenges the legitimacy of the al-Saud monarchy, as testified by the recent failed attack next to the Holy Medina’s mosque.
Counter-propaganda is one of the keys to disempower jihadi narrative both at the macro and the micro level. For instance, Kuwait has distributed circulars to mosques with approved language for Friday sermons. Abu Dhabi’s Hedayah International Centre of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism has organised conferences and workshops on jihadi ideology. In partnership with the United States, the UAE government has set up the Sawab Centre in Abu Dhabi, a social media platform aimed to counter extremist narratives and online propaganda.
The geopolitical factor
All the members of the Global Coalition have the same objective – defeating Daesh – but each partner has its own preferred scenarios for how the Middle East should look like afterwards. Therefore, regional powers’ competing interests tend to prevail, getting in the way of a full cooperative approach against the mutual threat of transnational jihadism.
The fight against the so-called caliphate has become inextricably intertwined with the Saudi-Iranian rivalry for regional hegemony. Like a poison, sectarianism has exacerbated confessional and ethnic rifts for the purposes of power politics, providing more ideological space for jihadi networks than before, especially in weak states. Coupled with last year’s deal on Iran’s nuclear programme between the “P5+1” (the UN Security Council's five permanent members plus Germany) and Iran, the stratified Syrian conflict mirrors the current disillusionment between the United States and Saudi Arabia: for Washington, the first enemy to fight is Daesh, while Riyadh prioritises the containment of Iran.
The United States’ leverage on belligerent Syrian factions has decreased since it decided not to intervene against Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Convergent views on Syria have instead enhanced the strategic alignment of France and Saudi Arabia in the region. And the consolidation of the Iran-Hezbollah-Russia axis in Syria has allowed Assad’s regime to secure its political role. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies have been forced by reality to abandon their main regional aspiration to break the “Shia arc”. Baghdad is increasingly falling under the Iranian sphere of influence, while the perspective of a Saudi-led military victory in Yemen remains a mirage.
Two regional dynamics
Turkey’s shifting regional alliances represent the latest game changer for the Syrian conflict. This realignment, which marks another point in favour of Assad’s presidency, will further weaken Saudi Arabia’s military and diplomatic influence, complicating the common fight against jihadists. In August 2016, Ankara intervened militarily in Syria to target Daesh and to contain Kurdish militias (mainly the People’s Protection Units, YPG, supported by the United States). Moreover, Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia, with regard also to the Syrian file, enhances the position of Assad’s regime vis-à-vis Sunni moderate opponents backed by the Gulf monarchies, which risks further empowering Salafi components such as Ahrar al-Sham and the jihadi Jabhat Fatah al-Sham.
In this fluid context, two regional dynamics emerge. The pivot of Middle Eastern security has moved to the East, since Iran, Russia and Turkey (all non-Arab states) currently drive regional politics, while Saudi Arabia tends to over-react in its military assertiveness, attempting to counterbalance unfavourable events.
Additionally, the eastern Mediterranean security complex now has a growing strategic role, not only in Middle Eastern balances but even in the global struggle to counter Daesh. Cyprus and its military air/naval bases (from which UK and French aircraft often take off to bomb jihadists) have reacquired a remarkable role, given also Russian military buildup in the Levant.
Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, the UAE and Jordan have resident embassies in Nicosia (UAE and Jordan have opened few months ago), while Saudi Arabia’s Resident Ambassador in Greece sent letters of credence from Athens to the president of the Republic of Cyprus in 2015. About Bahrain, a Cairo-Resident Bahraini Ambassador to Cyprus presented his credentials in 2015. This suggests that the Gulf monarchies will likely increase their strategic cooperation with Nicosia. Cyprus is a geographic and maritime security vanguard for the Gulf, lying at the crossroads between Suez, Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz.
Perspectives
Like other regional powers involved in the conflict, the Gulf monarchies have been trying to maximise their strategic gains in the Syrian theatre, in terms of territorial influences and local alliances. The fight against the so-called caliphate is just a piece of a broader scenario.
Due to its loss of physical territory between Syria, Iraq (and Libya), al-Baghdadi’s organisation has been transforming itself from being a non-state actor behaving like a state actor and is now carrying out large-scale terrorist attacks, just as the first al-Qaeda used to do. As a result, in Saudi Arabia’s eyes, Daesh is increasingly seen more as an internal security threat in terms of domestic attacks and the return of mujahidin, rather than a geopolitical issue. It is not by chance that Riyadh’s military engagement against Daesh has declined since the beginning of the Yemeni campaign, which instead represents a Saudi geopolitical interest vis-à-vis Teheran.
Yet, despite the complexity of the different elements and rivalries at play in the region, the Global Coalition to counter Daesh is a valuable opportunity to test in practice the state of Arab-Western military cooperation, with an eye also to the partnership between NATO and Gulf monarchies. In this framework, the GCC has shown a rare and effective example of unity in its recent history.
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998
Middle Eastern terrorist groups and their state sponsors continued to plan, train for, and conduct terrorist acts in 1998, although their actions cumulatively were less lethal than in 1997. The lower level of fatalities resulted from more effective counterterrorist measures by various governments and from the absence in 1998 of the kinds of major incidents that had killed dozens the previous year, such as the attack on Luxor temple in Egypt and a series of HAMAS suicide bombings in public places in Israel. The most dramatic terrorist acts attributed to Middle Eastern terrorists in 1998 actually occurred in Africa, where Usama Bin Ladin's multinational al-Qaida network bombed the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.
In Egypt, government security forces scored some successes in reducing violence by Islamist opponents, particularly the al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, which had conducted the lethal attack on tourists at Luxor in 1997. Judicial proceedings brought convictions against many terrorists. Deaths from terrorism-related incidents in 1998 fell to 47, fewer than one-third the number in 1997. Nonetheless, there was troubling evidence of a growing collaboration in other countries between Egyptian extremists--from both the Gama' and the Egyptian al-Jihad--and Usama Bin Ladin.
The Algerian Government also made progress in combating domestic terrorism in 1998, undertaking aggressive counterinsurgency operations again the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) that slowed the GIA's campaign of indiscriminate violence against civilians. As the GIA's bloody tactics drew increasing criticism both inside and outside Algeria, other militants joined the unilateral cease-fire that the Islamic Salvation Army had declared in late 1997.
Palestinian groups opposed to the peace process mounted terrorist attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. HAMAS conducted car bombings, shootings, and grenade attacks--injuring dozens of civilians--while two terrorists belonging to the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) launched a suicide bombing at a Jerusalem market. Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority conducted raids and arrests that undercut the extremists' ability to inflict as many fatalities as in previous years.
Security conditions in Lebanon improved in 1998, but the lack of complete government control in parts of Beirut, portions of the Bekaa Valley, and the so-called Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon enabled numerous terrorist groups to operate with relative impunity. Hizballah, HAMAS, the PIJ, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine--General Command (PFLP-GC) used camps in Lebanon for training and operational planning. The conflict in southern Lebanon between Lebanese armed groups and Israel and its local allies continued unabated.
In Yemen, foreign and indigenous extremists in 1998 conducted several bombings and numerous kidnappings, including the abduction and subsequent release of more than 60 foreign nationals. A group calling itself the Islamic Army of Aden claimed responsibility for the seizure of 16 Western tourists. The terrorists killed four of the hostages when Yemeni Government security forces tried to free them.
Iran, Syria, Libya, and Iraq all persisted in their direct and indirect state sponsorship of terrorism. In most cases, this support included providing assistance, training, or safehaven to terrorist groups opposed to the Middle East peace process. In some cases, particularly Iran and Iraq, it also included targeting dissidents and opponents of these authoritarian regimes for assassination or harassment.
Algeria
The Government of Algeria in 1998 made progress in combating domestic terrorism, which has claimed approximately 75,000 lives since Islamic extremists began their violent campaign to overthrow the government in 1992. The government intensified its counterinsurgency operations against the Armed Islamic Group, and several militant groups in 1998 joined the unilateral cease-fire declared by the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS)--the armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)--in October 1997. The GIA also suffered a number of setbacks to its networks in Europe. No foreign nationals were killed in acts of terrorism in Algeria during the year.
The GIA continued to conduct terrorist operations in Algeria in 1998, targeting a broad spectrum of Algerian civilians. The worst incident of 1998 occurred on 11 January during the holy month of Ramadan, when GIA extremists massacred numerous civilians in Sidi Hamed. Official estimates put the death toll at more than 100 civilians; press accounts reported the death toll even higher. Other smaller civilian massacres and acts of violence also continued throughout the year.
The seemingly indiscriminate and horrific violence against civilians--including women and children--was condemned widely in domestic and international circles and eroded Islamist support for the group abroad. The GIA's campaign of attacking civilians also exacerbated internal divisions: dissident GIA leader Hassan Hattab in May publicly criticized GIA faction leader Antar Zouabri for his attacks on civilians and in September formally separated from the GIA. Hattab created a new element, the Salafi Group for Call and Combat, aimed primarily at attacking security force elements. Despite the split from Zouabri, Hattab's faction continued to commit violence in Algeria throughout 1998. Hattab claimed responsibility for assassinating the popular Berber singer Matoub Lounes in June, an act that further alienated the Algerian public.
Bahrain
Minor security incidents continued to plague Bahrain in 1998. Bahraini security forces in November arrested several Bahraini and Lebanese citizens, seizing weapons and explosives, in connection with a plot to attack public facilities and other installations in Bahrain. Bahraini Prime Minister Shaykh Khalifa claimed the operation was planned in Lebanon, where members of the group reportedly had received military training. Some of those arrested allegedly also confessed to conducting arson attacks.
Bahrain continued in 1998 to seek the extradition of eight individuals--including five in the United Kingdom--who were convicted in absentia in November 1997 for orchestrating and funding from abroad a campaign aimed at disrupting Bahraini security.
Egypt
The number of deaths in 1998 from terrorist-related incidents fell to 47, fewer than one-third of the tally for 1997 and the lowest since 1992. Egyptian security forces increased security and counterterrorist operations against Egyptian extremists, particularly al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya, following its attack in November 1997 at Luxor that killed 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians. Trials of Egyptian extremists responsible for various terrorist acts were held throughout the year, resulting in several convictions. The improving security situation led tourism to increase in 1998. Egypt also hosted in October an Interpol conference that promoted international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Egypt also worked closely with other Arab countries in counterterrorism efforts, pursuant to an agreement reached among Arab interior ministers earlier in the year.
Despite the intensified security and counterterrorist actions following the Luxor incident, Egyptian extremists--particularly al-Jihad--continued to levy threats against Egypt and the United States for the arrests and extradition in 1998 of their cadre from Albania, Azerbaijan, South Africa, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Both al-Jihad and al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya signed terrorist sponsor Usama Bin Ladin's fatwa in February that called for attacks against US civilians, although al-Gama'at publicly denied that it is a member of Bin Ladin's World Islamic Front for the Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders. Al-Gama'at leaders imprisoned in Egypt followed the lead of imprisoned Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, issuing a public statement in early November that called for the cessation of operations in Egypt and urged al-Gama'at to create a "peaceful front." Gama'at leaders abroad endorsed the idea but emphasized they would continue to target US interests and support the jihad.
Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip
Violence and terrorism by Palestinian groups opposed to the peace process continued in 1998, albeit at a reduced level as compared with the previous two years. HAMAS alone launched more than a dozen attacks over the year. Among the more notable were grenade attacks in Hebron in September that injured 25 persons and in Beersheva in October that injured more than 50. A HAMAS car bomb in the Gaza Strip in late October killed one Israeli soldier and injured several schoolchildren. The PIJ attempted a car bombing in November in Jerusalem that killed only the two militants.
Other serious attacks against Israel and its citizens also occurred, including the shooting deaths of two settlers on guard duty in early August and the assassination of a prominent rabbi in Hebron later that month. Small bomb explosions in Tel Aviv in August and in Jerusalem in September wounded a total of 13 Israelis.
For its part, Israel continued vigorous counterterrorist operations, including numerous arrests and seizures of weapons and explosives. In one of the most significant actions of the year, Israeli forces on 10 September raided a farmhouse near Hebron, killing two leading HAMAS terrorists, Adil and Imad Awadallah.
The Palestinian Authority (PA), which is responsible for security in Gaza and most major West Bank cities, continued to act against Palestinian perpetrators of anti-Israeli violence. The PA's security apparatus preempted several attacks over the year, including a planned HAMAS double-suicide bombing staged from the Gaza Strip in late September. The PA launched several large-scale arrest campaigns targeting individuals with ties to terrorist organizations and detained several leading HAMAS and PIJ political figures. In one of the more significant operations of the year, the PA in late September uncovered a HAMAS bomb lab filled with hundreds of kilograms of explosives. At the same time, more PA effort is needed to enhance its bilateral cooperation with Israel and its unilateral fight against terrorism.
In late October, the PA and Israel signed the Wye River Memorandum, which includes a number of provisions for increased security cooperation.
Jordan
There were no major international terrorist attacks in Jordan in 1998, but several low-level incidents kept security forces focused on combating the terrorist threat. In February, amid rising tensions over Iraqi weapons inspections, the British Embassy in Amman was the target of a firebomb attack that caused no damage. Between mid-March and early May, the Reform and Defiance Movement--a small, mostly indigenous radical Islamic group--conducted a string of small bombings in Amman targeting Jordanian security forces, the Modern American School, and a major hotel. These attacks caused minor property damage.
Amman continued to maintain tight security along its borders and to interdict and prosecute individuals caught smuggling weapons and explosives, primarily intended for Palestinian rejectionist groups in the West Bank. In September, Amman convicted two Jordanians of possession of illegal explosives with the intent to commit terrorist acts and sentenced them to 15 years in prison with hard labor. The two reportedly had planned to attack Israelis in Israel or the West Bank. In October the state prosecutor referred to the security court the case of six men accused of possessing and selling of explosives to support terrorist aims.
Jordan permitted and monitored the limited presence of several Palestinian rejectionist groups, including HAMAS, the PIJ, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Palestine-General Command. The Jordanian Government allowed the HAMAS Political Bureau to maintain a small information office in Amman as well as personal offices for senior HAMAS members who live in Jordan, several of whom are Jordanian citizens. In 1998, Jordan did not permit known members of the group's military wing to reside or operate in country, however. In November, Jordan issued a public warning to HAMAS and other rejectionist groups that it would not tolerate acts that "impede implementation" of the Wye River Memorandum.
Jordan continued to cooperate with other regional states concerning terrorist threats to the region and in April signed the multilateral Arab Anti-Terrorism Agreement. King Hussein publicly voiced support for the US-UK initiative in the Pan Am 103 case.
Lebanon
Security conditions in Lebanon continued to improve in 1998, but lack of complete government control in several areas of the country--including portions of the Bekaa Valley and Beirut's southern suburbs--and easy access to arms and explosives throughout much of the country contributed to an environment with the potential for acts of violence. The Lebanese Government did not exert full control over militia groups engaged in fighting in and near the so-called security zone occupied by Israel and its proxy militia, the Army of South Lebanon.
In these areas, a variety of terrorist groups continued to operate with relative impunity, conducting terrorist training and other operational activities. These groups include Hizballah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the PIJ and the PFLP-GC. Hizballah presents the most potent threat to US personnel and facilities in Lebanon by an organized group. Although Hizballah has not attacked US interests in Lebanon since 1991, its animosity toward the United States has not abated, and the group continued to monitor the US Embassy and its personnel in Beirut. Hizballah leaders routinely denounced US policies in the region and sharply condemned the Wye River Memorandum between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
One anti-US attack occurred in Lebanon in 1998. On 21 June four rocket-propelled grenades were fired at the US Embassy in Beirut from some 700 meters away, falling only a short distance from their launch site and causing no damage. The grenades were launched from a crudely manufactured firing device, suggesting that the attack was not conducted by an organized group. Lebanese authorities responded swiftly to the incident, but as of 31 December investigators had not determined who had conducted the attack and there were no claims of responsibility. The reason for the attack is unclear, but its occurrence two days after Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri had visited Washington suggested it was intended as a sign of displeasure with US-Lebanese relations or was an attempt to embarrass Hariri.
Lebanese citizens also were the targets of random bombings in 1998. Car bombs targeted Amal and PIJ leaders in south Lebanon in October, a resident of Sidon in July, and a Sunni mayoral candidate in west Beirut in May. Although no one was killed, these incidents illustrate the potential danger from random political violence in Lebanon.
The Lebanese Government continued to support publicly international counterterrorist initiatives, and its judiciary system made limited progress in prosecuting terrorist court cases. In early June the Lebanese Supreme Court rejected a defense appeal for a retrial of five Japanese Red Army members and endorsed the three-year prison sentence handed down last year.
Saudi Arabia
There were several reported threats against US interests in Saudi Arabia in 1998 but no terrorist incidents. The US Embassy in Riyadh and Consulates in Jiddah and Dhahran closed for a few days in early October after receiving information that a terrorist attack was being planned against the Embassy.
Terrorist Usama Bin Ladin, whose Saudi citizenship was revoked in 1994, continued publicly to threaten US interests in Saudi Arabia in 1998. In a press conference in Afghanistan in May, Bin Ladin declared a holy war against US forces in the Arabian Peninsula, many of whom are stationed in Saudi Arabia. The declaration followed a communiqué in February in which Bin Ladin and other terrorists called for attacks on US and allied civilians and military interests worldwide.
The investigation into the bombing in June 1996 of the Khubar Towers housing facility near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, continued in 1998, but it has not been resolved. In that incident, a large truck bomb killed 19 US citizens and wounded more than 500 others. The Saudi Government has requested that the United States extradite Hani al-Sayegh--a Saudi national arrested by the Canadians and deported to the United States in 1997--so they may question him about his alleged role in the bombing. At the end of 1998 a decision on al-Sayegh's extradition case was pending with the US Immigration and Naturalization Service. In November, Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayif stated publicly that Bin Ladin was not responsible for the Khubar Towers bombing or the bombing in November 1995 of the Office of the Program Manager-Saudi Arabia National Guard (OPM/ SANG) facility in Riyadh, which killed seven persons. Nayif allowed that individuals motivated by Bin Ladin could have conducted the attacks, however.
Tunisia
There were no terrorist incidents reported in Tunisia in 1998. The Government of Tunisia remains publicly committed to countering terrorist threats, particularly from Islamic extremists. The government continued publicly to express its opposition to international terrorism, strongly condemning the terrorist attacks in August against the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Tunis also remains concerned about Algeria's violence spilling over into Tunisia and employs strict domestic security controls to counter this threat.
Tunisia continued to participate in regional counter-terrorism efforts. In January the government hosted a meeting of Arab League interior ministers at which an agreement was reached to enhance inter-Arab counterterrorism cooperation. Tunisia agreed to extradite convicted terrorists, improve information exchanges, and strengthen control on the infiltration and travel of suspected terrorists in Arab countries.
The government continued to prosecute individuals for membership in the outlawed An-Nahda movement, which it considers a terrorist organization, although there were no reports of terrorist attacks by the group in 1998. On 2 June a Tunisian court found two Tunisian nationals guilty of assassinating Belgian Vice Premier Andre Cools in Liege in 1991 and sentenced them to 20-year prison terms.
Yemen
A series of bombings in 1998 in Sanaa and southern Yemen caused numerous casualties and some property damage. A bombing in April at a mosque near Sanaa killed two persons and injured 27 others, including two US citizens. In response to the bombings, Yemeni authorities in August announced the arrest of several Yemeni oppositionists, alleging they were working for "foreign parties." Interior Minister Arab also blamed "foreign groups" for a bombing in September at a market in Aden that caused two deaths and 27 injuries. In August the United States warned US citizens in Yemen of a threat to US interests there, days after terrorists bombed the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Three persons were killed and several were injured in November when a car bomb exploded near the German Embassy in Sanaa.
Yemeni tribesmen kidnapped and released more than 60 foreign nationals in l998, more than three times the number abducted in 1997. The Islamic Army of Aden--a little known Islamic group that has issued anti-US threats--claimed responsibility for the kidnapping in late December of 16 Western tourists, including two US citizens. Four of the tourists died, and two others--including one US citizen--were wounded during a Yemeni Government rescue attempt that liberated the remaining hostages. Following the incident, the group issued a statement calling for the lifting of sanctions against Iraq. In addition, gunmen in December shot and wounded a US citizen working on a Dutch agricultural development project while they were attempting to hijack his car. The Yemeni Government issued a decree in August implementing severe punishment--including execution--for kidnappers and stepped up enforcement of the law on unlicensed weapons in major cities.
Continuing efforts begun in 1997, the Yemeni Government took further steps to rein in foreign extremists. Sanaa increased its security cooperation with other Arab countries and reportedly forced several foreign extremists to leave Yemen. The government also instituted the requirement that Algerian, British, Egyptian, Libyan, Sudanese, and Tunisian nationals seeking entry into Yemen travel directly from their home counties. Nevertheless, the government's inability to control many remote areas continued to make the country a safehaven for terrorist groups.